Further Differences Between Nishitani and Buber

YESTERDAY I discussed Nishitani's analysis of human interaction, something he contrasts with Martin Buber's "I-Thou," concluding that an encounter between two subjects who are governed by universal law restricts freedom by way of an enforced equality from without.

In many of the stories that one finds in the Zen kōans, to receive the name of a stranger means appropriating both the bearer's title and his or her very being. This is consistent with wider Japanese culture in that, if a woman disclosed her name to a man, she was considered to have given herself to him completely. Before long, speaking in the name of a deity gave someone the feeling that they had been dramatically empowered in some way and this led to the inflation of the human ego. Lest we imagine that notions pertaining to the literal possession of a name are only to be found in the dim and distant past, Nishitani explains that

"men were once, long ago, in contact with reality in a very real way, and indeed experienced themselves as having their being within that reality. Perhaps the name was perceived realiter because reality was intimately felt, concretely lived, directly realized. This would indicate that the interpretation of the name as being 'just a name' shows up the intellect in its isolation from reality. Might not, then, the 'awakened intellect' conceal a fall into a greater blindness? Might not our pride in the so-called scientific age be an expression of folly, of our lack of awareness of our own utter blindness?"

As a consequence, when presented in light of Nishitani's philosophy Zen throws Buber's "I-Thou" into further doubt. Although one differentiates oneself from another as a result of bearing a particular name, becoming the name in the process, this state of affairs is only seen to be operational within the field of consciousness, or the relative world, and thus accords with Buber's own narrow interpretation in that his juxtaposition between subject and object inevitably sets up an opposition. For Nishitani, on the other hand, the idea that someone can take on the identity of another merely by enquiring of their name demonstrates that behind these jealously guarded appellations lies something more substantial:

"Here one might think of absolute non-differentiation, absolute oneness, absolute sameness. We find this expressed in Western thought, in such things as the Oneness of Plotinus and the Absolute Identity of Schelling. It is the point at which all relationship ceases to exist, with nothing to call it back. There is neither self nor other; hence there is no person and no personal relationship left."

Buber's "I" becomes Buber's "Thou" and vice versa, meaning that absolute non-differentiation transforms "I" into "true I" and "Thou" into "true Thou". In the words of the Diamond Sutra, from which Nishitani draws inspiration:

“The I-Thou relation is an I-Thou relation because it is not an I-Thou relation.”

Note the prevalence of an absolute opposition, too. Not a relative opposition in the everyday sense, but one which differentiates and non-differentiates at the same time. Ultimately, the identity of each belongs to the Absolute and yet there is no universal concept to deny "I" and "Thou" the freedom and autonomy of their being:

"Thus, absolute opposition is at the same time absolute harmony. Both are the same. Here, absolute opposition is, as it is, a sport, and absolute harmony is not simply non-differentiation. Self and other are not one, and not two. To be not one and not two means that each self retains its absoluteness while still being relative, and that in this relativity the two are never for a moment separated. While the I to be the I acknowledges the Thou in relation to the Thou’s own absolute non-differentiation, and thus permits itself to become absolutely the Thou, at the same time it takes the Thou to itself. Situated within this absolute non-differentiation which opens up in the I, the I is the I itself—I am I."

Nishitani contrasts the difference between his philosophy of human interaction and that of Buber as a case of "eating or being eaten" in the latter, and of "eating and being eaten" in the former. The problems inherent within Buber's thought are attributable to self-attachment, whereby one clings to the idea of the "other". Attachment of any form, in the Buddhist sutras, are said to arise from blindness and ignorance. Furthermore, attachment to universal law established on the basis of an enforced equality - divine or otherwise - results in the abrogation of absolute freedom and absolute identity.