Julius Evola's Revolt, Part 4: Views on Law, the State and Empire

LAW, from Evola's perspective, is said to be inseparable with the tenets of "truth, reality and stability". The fact that power and authority descend from that which is spiritually transcendent, rather than proceeding upwards from the human realm, bestows upon the legal domain a divine legitimacy that outweighs all earthly considerations:

As a natural consequence, traditional man either ignored or considered absurd the idea that one could talk about laws and the obedience due them if the laws in question had a mere human origin—whether individual or collective. Every law. in order to be regarded as an objective law, had to have a “divine” character. Once the “divine” character of a law was sanctioned and its origin traced back to a non-human tradition, then its authority became absolute: this law became then something ineffable, inflexible, immutable and beyond criticism. [p.21.]

Inevitably, therefore, anything which is deemed to be a transgression of this law is not viewed merely as a standard crime against the entire society but as something which brings religious shame and dishonour to both an individual and his or her family. Needless to say, once spiritual authority is placed at the very root of the judiciary it is very difficult to plead one's case on more secular grounds and this state of affairs invariably results in charges of heresy.

Law within the context of Tradition is not something purely functional, as it is today, but part and parcel of the entire natural order:

The notion of usefulness is the ultimate materialistic criterion of modern society, though that was not the case in traditional societies, which rather regarded it as a means to be employed in the function of a higher purpose. [p.22.]

This, as we saw in the previous section of this series, is a consequence of power emanating from above and then appearing in the person of the just monarch.

Evola's thoughts then turn to the character of the state, setting forth the idea that political, social and economic affairs must never be confined to the temporal order as they are in the modern world and that it was once common for Traditional societies to enjoy considerable power in the way that the Catholic hierarchy was able to exert its influence on the governmental affairs of Europe:

In this way, traditional states and empires often employed the symbols of “centrality” and of “polarity” that have been associated with the archetype of regality. [p.23.]

Returning to what Evola said about the "doctrine of the two natures" in Chapter One, a term alluding to the separation of the physical and metaphysical realms, he reapplies it here in relation to the division of state and people (demos). Although non- or anti-Traditional states are said to receive their legitimacy from the populace, Evola completely dismisses this notion on the grounds that it is an "ideological perversion". Whilst I understand why the Italian is so opposed to non-spiritual forms of authority, this is something that rarely ever happens in practice. At least with regard to ordinary people being able to have a say in the running of the state, because all modern governments are controlled by large banks and corporations whose sole interest is self-enrichment at the expense of the many.

Nonetheless, Evola is keen to associate more authentic forms of popular authority with

naturalistic social forms lacking an authentic spiritual chrism. Once this direction was taken, an inevitable downward spiralling occurred, which ended with the triumph of the collectivistic world of the masses and with the advent of radical democracy. [p.24.]

The solution, for the author of Revolt Against the Modern World, is the re-establishment of "order from above" and this even involves overcoming the idea of human "rights". That, at least, I can agree with and the contemporary notion that we have a "right" to anything is a fallacy based wholly on anthropocentrism. This is not to say that people shouldn't be involved in the decision-making process, of course, although Evola is quick to reject anything which does not have the divine seal of approval.

In order to elucidate further upon the thorny issue of social order, the Baron makes reference to the caste system of the Indo-Europeans (Aryans). As we know from the prophecies of the Vishnu Purana, societies will fall into the hands of barbarians and established monarchies will abandon their responsibilities and go on to rule with an iron fist. The prevailing caste will be that of the shudra, or lowly artisans and labourers, whilst those in the vaishya caste will abandon farming and agriculture and find themselves treated like serfs. Elsewhere, the warriors of the kshatriya caste will plunder the land and property of their own people, instead of protecting them, whilst the priestly brahmins will lose their inner piety and self-respect and be treated like ordinary men.

Evola, meanwhile, points out that the character differences between the "twice-born" ārya of the Aryan nobility and the "promiscuous substratum" of the śūdra is a fitting analogy of the gradual decline of the caste system itself. Originally, he tells us, the śūdra were kept in check by the priestly brāhmana and this is similar to the role that was later performed by the state and its rule of law. By using this example, Evola wants to create an affinity between the state and the universality of divine kingship, but this seems like an awfully vague and unlikely justification for Traditional governance beyond that of the initiated monarch.

Indeed, whilst he accepts that the state was a later development it seems odd to include it within the Traditionalist world-view when we humans have managed to survive without it for the vast majority of our history and pre-history. As we have seen, although Evola distinguishes between two civilisations he does not reject civilisation itself and this, in the view of the present writer, is an error. Traditionalists such as René Guenon have managed to bypass the problem of the state by either speaking favourably of theocracy or highlighting the superiority of spiritual power over that of the temporal, but Evola - and this is partly why some of his admirers have included fascists and other totalitarianians - continues to view the state as a vehicle for Tradition.

The third component in the author's triad is the empire, which Evola sees as a logical continuance of both law and the state. Whilst the latter is ordinarily confined within specific borders, the empire develops to the extent that it outgrows its geographical boundaries and takes the idea of unity to an entirely new level.

The political objections to empire are well known, with some of the more disastrous examples of modern imperialism including British India and the Belgian Congo, but Evola tries to look beyond the administrative considerations with a view to legitimising empire in the sense that the Traditional caste warriors of the ancient world are said to export their spiritual values to other nations. Naturally, I very much doubt that those who were forced to relinquish their sovereignty would agree with this assertion, but for Evola the empire becomes a metaphysical reality that transcends the limitations of time and space. To use a particular example, it was once held that

the “world” will not end as long as the Roman Empire existed. This idea is connected to the function of mystical salvation attributed to the empire, provided that the “world” is not understood in physical or political terms but rather in terms of “cosmos” and of a dam of order and stability containing the disruptive forces of chaos. [p.27.]

Although one might ask how it is possible for one Traditionalist society to triumph over another, Evola reminds us that there is only ever one "Lord of the World" and his divine justice stands or falls on the basis that he secures victory - not to mention territory and resources - for his people.

Of course, the consecrated figurehead that sits at the very centre of this expansive force is the emperor himself and he is

one who, “owning everything and no longer wishing for anything else,” is free of concupiscence, and who can therefore allow peace and justice to reign and thus strengthen the active life of his subjects; after the original sin, this life can no longer resist the seductions of cupiditas unless a higher power controls it and directs it. [pp.27-8.]

The term cupiditas relates to an ardent longing and Evola is suggesting that under later imperial entities, such as that of the Ghibbeline Middle Ages, none but the emperor was capable of controlling the earthly passions of his subjects.

Whilst appreciating that Dante Aligheri (1265-1321) was one of the more honourable members of medieval society, Evola takes this opportunity to criticise his attitude towards the role of emperor in terms of having placed far too much value on one's ability to obtain foreign territory or bend princely rivals to one's will.

Whilst one may object to Evola's defence of empire, he would contend that the political aspects I mentioned above do not really apply to Traditional societies and that

the empires would be replaced by “imperialisms” and the state would be understood only as a temporal, national, particularistic, social, and plebeian organization. [p.28.]

One cannot argue with that, even if - as we have seen - there is no authentically "plebeian" aspect to Western democracy at all.